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the late 1980s, artists such as
Bruce Springsteen and Prince were
1

Some
on top of the music world.
radio stations, however, were playing
their music for reasons other than
quality or popularity. 2 Independent
record promoters supplied radio programmers with cocaine, prostitutes,
and hundreds of thousands of dollars
in exchange for airplay for these and
other artists. 3 Such illicit deals may
seem inconceivable to
easy listeners, but, in the
high stakes music industry, songs must get airplay if artists and record
labels are to survive.

motional
albums. 4

tool
Many

to

sell

people

ments for broadcasts which are properly disclosed under the law.

tion to radio stations and their
employees in exchange for airplay -

the environment

are generally illegal under federal
law. Theoretically, these laws prohibit only undisclosed payola practices. Payola scandals of the late
1980s, however, illustrate that such
practices have not ended. 6 In fact,
the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(the "Act") created an environment in

The term "payola" was originally
coined by the publication Variety in
1938 to refer to the music industry
practice of paying money to people in
exchange for promoting a particular
piece of music. 8 Today, the term
refers to bribery and corrupt practices in any business,
though its use in the
music industry refers to
payments of any type
made in exchange for

an

broadcast of material.
Payola has always

old

For record labels, radio
is the most powerful pro-

the payment of

cash, drugs, or any other considera-

existed in the music
industry
in
various

taLctic

buy albums based solely
on what they hear on the
radio. 5 Radio airplay's
link to album sales provides record labels powerful incentives to ensure
broadcast of their songs.
Accordingly,
record
labels devise various
marketing and promotional
strategies
to
secure radio station airplay. Such tactics range from T-shirt
giveaways, contests, and free concerts offered in conjunction with
radio stations to paid vacations,
cash, and even illegal goods provided
to radio programmers. In all of these
promotional practices, the goal is the
same: gain exposure for a song by
promising radio stations greater revenues, increased listenership, and
untraceable kickbacks for programmers.
Despite the prevalence of these
practices, promotional strategies

ina
new
environm ennnt

forms.
The practice
never garnered widespread attention from the
public at large until the
1950s and 1960s. During
that period, disc jockeys
became powerful gatekeepers who determined
what music the public
heard.
Some in the
music industry exploited

By Douglas Abe l
which pay-for-play, a disclosed and
fully legal form of payola, could
thrive. 7 The possibility of returning
to practices reminiscent of illegal
payola has, however, sparked debate
as to whether record labels should
ever pay radio stations to play their
music, legally or illegally. This Note
resolves the debate by examining the
history, current practices, and legality of record companies' promotional
practices. This Note concludes that
the music business may be better
served by engaging in explicit pay-

this

concentration

of

power
by bribing disc
jockeys to play certain songs. The
practice grew into a scandal involving rival parties accusing each other
of illicit activities.
This scandal
resulted in probing Congressional
and
Federal
Communications
Commission investigations into the
activities of many disc jockeys and
their stations. Federal laws were
soon passed to address the scandal
and deal with the payola situation,
but the practice persisted. In fact,
the 1980s witnessed a resurgence of
the practice through independent

record promoters. These promoters
paid to have a song included on the
This
playlist of various stations.
practice influenced charts in trade
publications and other station
playlists that tracked the charts.
The primary impetus behind the
practice in the 1960s, 1980s, and
today is the fact that there are more
songs being produced than can be
heard by the public. Supply and
demand is and always has been a
basic imbalance for the music industry.9 The Telecommunications Act of
1996, however, has added additional
pressures to the normal market environment of the music industry. As a
result, payola is not only increasing
in use but is taking on new forms that
are arguably illegal and, at a minimum, fuel anti-payola sentiments.

impact of the 1996
telecommunications act
The Telecommunications Act of
1996 has a clearly stated purpose:
To promote competition
and reduce regulation in
order to secure lower prices
and higher quality services
for American telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommuni10
cations technologies.
The deregulation of the telecommunications industry proposed by
the Act required the deregulation of
broadcast ownership. Pursuant to
the Communications Act of 1934, the
Federal Communications Commission enforces regulations concerning
In 1996,
broadcast stations. 1 1
Congress ordered the FCC to modify
its regulations concerning the ownership of AM and FM broadcast sta-

tions. 12

The new regulations set
forth the number of stations one entity may own, adjusting that number
based on the size of the applicable
market. For example, "in a radio
market with 45 or more commercial
radio stations, a party may own,
operate, or control up to 8 commercial radio stations, not more than 5 of
which are in the same service (AM or
In addition, the FCC is
FM)." 13
authorized "to permit a person or
entity to own, operate, or control, or
have a cognizable interest in, radio
broadcast stations if the Commission
determines that such ownership,
operation, control, or interest will
result in an increase in the number
of radio broadcast stations in operation."1 4 The Act, therefore, creates a
deregulated environment in which
more radio stations may operate
while ownership of those stations
becomes concentrated in fewer hands.
As a result, a few companies now
dominate a majority of radio stations
in a given market. 15 Clear Channel
Communications Inc. and AMFM
Inc., for example, recently agreed to
merge, forming the world's largest
radio company with 830 stations in
small, medium, and large cities
around the United States and reaching more than 100 million listeners
Such consolidation has
weekly.16
made a large impact on the music
industry, essentially redefining the
environment in which record labels
and radio stations operate. The consolidation not only enables stations
to cut costs by eliminating duplicative operations, but the stations gain
leverage in negotiating programming, advertising, and other deals
through their control of a larger segment of the audience. 17 Prior to the
Act, ownership of stations was more
diverse and provided record labels
54

numerous outlets for their products.
For example, whenever one station
in a market refused to air a song,
other stations were available as outlets. In the new environment, however, multiple stations in the same
market are controlled by the same
entity, effectively reducing the number of outlets available.1 8 One group
of stations may refuse to play a song
and preclude access to an entire
market. Thus, consolidation of radio
stations has concentrated negotiating
power and essentially produced fewer
outlets for record labels in each market.
19
This outlet shortage is not new.
Recording companies are aware that
all songs can never reach all listeners. It is exactly this problem that
produces payola. The deregulated
environment created by the Act,
however, exacerbates this scarcity by
reducing the already inadequate
number of independent outlets. The
increased competition to gain access
to these outlets only heightens the
temptation for record labels to turn
to payola. This moral hazard now
tempts radio stations as well.
Consolidation in station ownership
has left station owners in debt, desperate for ways to service the debt
and provide a return on the purchase
of the stations. 20 The result is pressure on individual stations to
increase revenue through advertisOne
ing and other sources. 2 1
untapped revenue stream is the
In the 1960s and
record labels. 2 2
1970s, record labels devoted much of
their marketing/promotion budgets
to radio stations. 23 In recent years,
the record labels have directed these
budgets away from radio to other
media such as television and print. 2 4
Payola is an effective means of
attracting these marketing dollars
back to radio. Whether it is a legiti-

mate means is another question.

and necessary practice. 2 6 In the late
1950s, "booze, broads, and bribes
came to signify the situation." 27 As
investigations by the government

Though payola has always been
present in some form in the music
industry, the new environment has
elevated it from a helpful promotional aid to a necessary tactic for survival in an industry plagued by
scarce airtime and
tight
revenues.
Furthermore, the new
environment makes
thE

uncovered rampant use of payola,
kickbacks, and bribes, the practice
became associated with promotion of

telecommunications act of

payola more effective.
Consolidated owner-

1 9 96... has added additional

ship creates the possibility
of
securing

prE)ssures to the normal

gal activities.
Proponents, while
shunning illegal payola and its related activities, want to engage in practices clearly permitted under payola
laws. Despite this underlying concern with payola and its stigma, the
current debate rarely focuses on pollcies underlying payola regulations,
such as consumer/public protection and prevention of
bribery, tax evasion, and other
illicit activities. Instead, the
music industry's debate focuses on how such payments
affect the players in the industry and the music itself.

national

airplay for
one price as opposed to
separate payments to
numerous local disc
jockeys and record
promoters.
Payola,
however, is illegal if
undisclosed. 2 5
In
order to circumvent
this legal barrier,

rket environment of the

ME

the price of payola

isic industry. ....

m L

Critics

of payment for
broadcast contend that the
practice would infect the relationship between record labels

pa yola is not only increasing
in

use but is taking on new

for

ms that are arguably illegal

an d, at a minimum, fuel

and radio stations, resulting in
mediocre radio, declining listenership, and falling advertising revenues. Payment for

an ti-payola sentiments.

broadcast would result in the
30
airing of unproven songs.

record labels
and
radio stations are
developing new strategies, such as pay-forplay, and other innovative
practices. The essential
purpose behind these strategies is to
secure increased exposure for the
labels and increased money for the

stations. Fearing the stigma of payola practices of the past, the music
industry has not openly supported
such tactics but has entered an ongoing debate as to whether record
labels should offer radio stations consideration in exchange for airplay.

the debate
Historically, actors in the music
industry have publicly shunned and
denied the existence of payola,
though privately it was an accepted

substandard music, perjury, and tax
evasion. 28 In the 1970s and 1980s,
these activities were replaced by illicit payments involving increasingly
large sums of money, drugs, and
prostitutes. 2 9
Though many are
appalled by under-the-table influence and its effects, the memories of
related activities-more so than the
act of paying for airplay itself-evoke
the negative reactions to any and all
forms of payola. These past abuses
now animate both sides of the current payola debate.
Critics of payola want to avoid any
practices, legal or not, reminiscent of
past payola scandals and related ille-

Rather than being selected by
research, sales, marketing,
and requests, the music would be
determined by the parties with the
deepest pockets. 3 1 Furthermore,
payments would transform music
from

artistic expression to an
infomercial. 32 Such a system would
make broadcast choices akin to
advertising, wherein each paid and
disclosed song evidences a commer33
cial exchange.
In addition to the fear of infomercial-ridden radio, many critics
believe that because some labels are
willing to pay for broadcast, radio
stations will begin to charge all
record labels. 34 In effect, radio stations would extort money from record

labels just to do their job. 3 5 The first
signs of this are payments for "backannouncing," the traditional radio
practice of informing the listeners of
the name and album of songs just
played. Most in the industry believe
back-announcing is a basic element
of a station's job, not a source of additional compensation. 36 With this
increased emphasis on money and
possibility of extortion, new artists
and independent labels will find it
even more difficult to gain exposure. 3 7 Without the clout and economic resources of the large record
labels, payment for broadcast could
drive small independent acts into
extinction. 38 Thus, payment for broadcast threatens the quality of music
and the survival of those making it.

the power of payola
Proponents of payment for broadcast argue that paying for radio stations to play songs, accompanied by
legally required disclosures, will not
destroy the music industry but may
help it. They claim that payment for
broadcast is standard practice in the
music industry. With payments for
broadcast already influencing, if not
determining, songs played, it is
unlikely that disclosed payments for
broadcast will suddenly make radio
In fact, widemore commercial.
spread use of disclosed pay-for-play
makes radio more honest. Rather
than spending resources on trips,
free records, and other promotional
gimmicks, record labels may spend
money more efficiently by securing
airplay directly, the best marketing
and sales tool in the music industry.
Limiting promotional budgets to payments for broadcast helps rein in the
spiraling costs of these promotions as
well as costs of independent consul-

tants, tip sheets, and new technologies. 39 Rather than paying all of
these costs in hope of receiving airplay, the record labels can simply pay
for a broadcast and receive guaranteed exposure. This direct money
payment system is also better for the
radio stations. Instead of T-shirts,
trips, or free concerts that may or
may not increase listenership and
advertising revenues, the stations
receive cash that goes directly to
helping the bottom line. With disclosed payment for broadcast, the
labels get airplay and the stations get
revenue, benefiting all the parties,
even small independent record labels.
Independent record labels lack
capital to fully participate in promotional pay-for-play such as free concerts, trips, and giveaways. With
disclosed payment for broadcast,
however, they are guaranteed a
return on their investment. These
independents recognize that they
cannot pay the high price involved
with many promotional/marketing
practices currently used to pay for
broadcasts. 4 0 As Don Rose, president of the independent label
Rykodisc, says, "If I had the opportunity to bet on my song, right now I've
got to put money on the table, and it
may or may not get played ...[But] if
I had an opportunity to actually put
the money on the table and let it get
out there and let the consumer
decide, to me that's more attractive
than allowing the system to
decide." 4 1 The direct payment option
removes the current speculation
regarding the promotional costs that
often result in no exposure for small
labels. Pay-for-play is simply a more
certain market transaction. In the
end, pay-for-play allows limited
funds to be spent in a more effective manner, benefiting these inde-

pendent labels.
In addition, payment for broadcast
would reduce exploitation in the
relationship.
artist/label/radio
Securing airplay with payments
gives the labels a bigger return on
promotional dollars while avoiding
promotional gimmicks that harm
artists. Free concerts, for example,
are a promotional gamble that labels
provide to radio stations in hope of
gaining exposure for their artists.
Such concerts, however, exploit and
often harm the artists. Though the
acts gain exposure, the quality of the
exposure is questionable and often
comes at a cost. 42 In free concerts,
the artists usually must perform
brief sets, often inferior shows that
leave a negative impression among
43
fans who expect a full-blown event.
New artists are unable to develop as
touring acts, and established artists
must often skip free concert cities

when on their actual tour. 4 4 These
events are costly, harming the bottom line of the bands, their man45
agers, agents, and promoters.
Considering the costs and the minimal airplay gained from this method,
artists are much better served if this
money is directed at payments for

broadcast. It improves their position
and helps reduce the exploitation in
the artist/label/radio relationship.
Proponents also point out that the
biggest advantage to payment for
broadcast is its positive effect on the
quality of the music. Disclosed payments creates a self-regulating system that nurtures music as an art
form while openly negotiating the
economic realities of the music business. The ability to guarantee airplay allows record labels to take
some risks and provide artistically
advanced or different material that,
absent payment, radio shuns in favor

With the
of proven standards. 46
guaranteed play, labels can be more
innovative in what they send to radio
and can nurture artistic freedom in
In the end, the consumer, not a program director favoring the security of the status quo,
determines the hits of today and the
the artists.

stars of tomorrow. Record labels
may initially be tempted to pay for
all their material, from the innovative to the inferior. Radio stations,
however, can not afford to fill airtime
with too many substandard or inappropriate songs. Any station that
plays unlikable songs alienates listeners and risks traditional advertisFurthermore, any
ing revenues.
record label that supplies such unlikable songs loses consumer support.
The commercial reality of the music
business, therefore, demands the airing of good songs. Most consumers
purchase albums based solely on
what they hear on the radio, functionally making every song a short
but vital infomercial for the album.
Proponents embrace this economic
reality, arguing that it forces record
labels to supply good music in order
to appease radio listeners and effectively market/sell albums. Payment
for broadcast enables radio stations
and record labels to address economic matters and needs while continuing to nurture and expand music as
an art form.
In sum, detractors of payment for
broadcast claim that introducing
widespread use of such payments
would harm the music industry,
potentially plaguing the musical
landscape with past scandals.
Proponents of payment for broadcast
argue that the musical landscape is
already plagued by illegal payola.
Making payments for broadcast a
market transaction would avoid illic-

it abuse and ensure the viability of
the business and the quality of the
music. Though these arguments present a near unresolvable industry
conflict, the law regarding payments
for broadcast holds the secret to
resolving the debate.

the law
The Communications Act of 1934
was passed "for the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and
radio so as to make available . . .a
rapid, efficient, nationwide, and
world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges ....47
With this pronouncement, the federal government assumed the task of
regulating wire and radio communi-

Congress
amended
the
Communications Act of 1934, changing an existing payola provision and
adding a new section. 5 2 Prior to
these changes, only payments
received by radio stations in
exchange for broadcasting certain
regulated. 53
were
material
Payments to other parties, such as
54
disc jockeys, were not addressed.
The Communication Act Amendments of 1960, however, altered this
regulatory landscape.
The Amendments were enacted on
September 13, 1960.55 One of the
stated purposes was "to require disclosure of payments made for the
broadcasting of certain matter." 5 6
This particular purpose demonstrated Congressional intent to fashion
anti-payola regulations. 5 7 The result

cations throughout the country. To
further this purpose, authority was
centralized in a newly created commission, the Federal Communica-

was an expanded §317 addressing
radio station duties to disclose payments for broadcast and a new §508
addressing disclosure of payments to
individuals connected with broad-

tions Commission. 4 9 Despite this
concentration of federal communications regulation, only an investiga-

casts. Pursuant to §317,
All matter broadcast by
any radio station for which

tion by the House of Representatives
would eventually force the FCC to
50
deal with payola.

any money, service or other
valuable consideration is
directly or indirectly paid,
or promised to or charged
or accepted by, the station

48

In the late 1950s, the House
Special Subcommittee on Legislative
Oversight held an investigation into
the "fixing" of quiz shows on television. When the investigation into the
television quiz shows ended, the committee focused on payola in the music
industry. The investigation, however, focused on rock and roll, small
record companies, and disc jockeys,
purposely overlooking the major
labels. Nevertheless, the investigation revealed numerous cases of
bribes to disc jockeys, tax evasion,
and outside influence on radio station programming. 5 1 As a result,
....
....
57 ....

so broadcasting, from any
person, shall, at the time
the same is so broadcast,
be announced as paid for or
furnished, as the case may
be, by such person ...[t]he
licensee of each radio station shall exercise reasonable diligence to obtain
from its employees, and
from other persons with
whom it deals directly in
connection with any program or program matter

for broadcast, information
to enable such licensee to
make the announcement
required ... 58
In addition, §508 now requires
any employee of a radio station who accepts or agrees
to accept from any person
(other than such station), or
any person (other than
such station) who pays or
agrees to pay such

affected the choice of broadcast material is a question of fact for the
FCC. 6 5 The FCC, therefore, has the

the selection and presentation of

is warranted. 6 6 Stations that violate
the §317 disclosure requirements are

material. 71 In fact, the FCC has
stated that "The basic principle
underlying statutory provisions ... is,
as we have often stated, that the
public is entitled to know by whom it
is persuaded" and "to this end,
Congress adopted Sections 317 and

subject to fines and license revocation. 6 7 Record labels and station
employees who violate §508 disclo-

508 .... ,,72 In ruling on a challenged
transfer, the FCC must determine
two issues: whether payment for

discretion to make factual findings in
determining if the actions violate the
regulations and, if so, what penalty

broadcast has occurred and, if
so, whether any accompanying disclosure was suffi-

employee, any money,
service or other valu-

Radio stations... may not

able consideration for
the broadcast of any
matter over such sta-

engage in undisclosed

tion shall, in advance
of such broadcast, dis-

payments for broadcast and

close the fact of such
acceptance or agree59
ment to such station.
Thus,

a record

label

may not pay, give, or
promise a radio station
money or any other valuable consideration in exchange
for airplay unless the payment is
properly disclosed. 60 Likewise, disc
jockeys and other radio station
employees may not receive such payments unless they or the paying
party discloses the fact of the payments to the radio stations, which, in
turn, must disclose such payments at
the time of broadcast. 6 1 The law further requires that the radio stations
exercise reasonable diligence to
ensure that this statutory duty is
Radio stations, therefore,
met. 6 2
may not engage in undisclosed payments for broadcast and must monitor their employees to insulate them
63
from the lure of illegal payments.
When evaluating potential violations, the FCC examines the "sub64
stantial evidence" in the record.
Whether the actions of the parties

cient to immunize it.

fcc determination of
payment made

must monitor their employe(

The threshold issue in
determining illegal payola

to insulate them from the lur e

is if a payment for broadcast
actually
occurs.

of illegal payments.
sure requirements are subject to
criminal penalties of up to one year
in jail and fines up to $10,000.68
Thus, whether the violating party is
a radio station, a station employee,
or a paying party, there is substan69
tial risk in payola.
Though Congress intended these
regulations and penalties as antipayola measures, the parties may
nevertheless participate in payment
for broadcast as long as the material
broadcast is accompanied by a proper
70

disclosure.
In carrying out its
obligation to execute and enforce
these regulations, the FCC does not
categorically forbid record labels
from paying radio stations and their
employees to play songs. Instead,
the FCC only requires that the public
be informed of payments affecting

of
payment,
course, no disclosure is
necessary. FCC decisions
have set forth factors such

Without

as explicit agreements and inducements for evaluating payments that
mandate disclosures.
The primary question is whether
an explicit agreement has been made
to pay for a broadcast. 73 Explicit
exchanges of some consideration for
74
a broadcast require disclosure.
According to the FCC decision In re
General Media Assocs., Inc., even
payments to a third party for the
inclusion of certain matter in a program requires disclosure. 75 Though
the broadcasting party did not
receive payment, the FCC required
disclosure nonetheless, reasoning
that "had the consideration for the
inclusion of the broadcast matter
been received by the radio stations ...
instead of General Media they would
have been required to make an

appropriate sponsorship identification .... "76 This situation involved a
hidden payment to a third party

an item implicitly casts the item as
valuable consideration. The statute's
"valuable consideration" require-

explicitly for a particular broadcast.
Thus, an explicit exchange of money
for the broadcast of certain matter
requires disclosure, regardless of
whether the transaction involves the
broadcaster or a secret third party.

ment, therefore, appears to be a
catch-all term that permits the FCC
wide latitude in evaluating facts.
Thus, if a station solicits consideration of any type or a party pays con-

Exchanges

involving

nominal

amounts of money or consideration
with questionable value also require
disclosure. 7 7 The FCC has found a
payola violation when listeners dedicated songs and sent nominal
amounts of money to the station's
disc jockeys to ensure airing of the
song. 78 Though the payments were
minimal and created no pecuniary
benefit to the paying listeners, disThe FCC
closure was required.

sideration of any nature to broadcast
certain material, the FCC will likely
find a payment for broadcast and
82
require a disclosure.
Though sometimes an explicit
agreement provides consideration to
secure airplay, it is often difficult to
determine if the consideration is
"directly or indirectly paid, or
promised to or charged or accepted
by the radio station."8 3 A record
label could provide consideration to a
radio station without explicitly

found that "a practice of a licensee
permitting its announcers to keep
money sent by listeners constitutes

demanding airplay. The record company may simply hope to secure airplay without a formal agreement.

payments to the announcers in lieu
of additional salary, wages, or bonus-

Such implied payments for broadcast
have been addressed by the FCC. In
a public notice issued prior to the

es, and constitutes indirect consideration to the station ... ."79 In a case

involving payments to help an individual gain exposure as an announcer, the FCC held "the language of the
act is clear and includes all matter
broadcast for which payment is made
[B]enefit derived by the purchaser of the broadcast time is not
the determinative factor as to
whether an announcement should be
made."8 0 The FCC again focused primarily on the fact a payment
occurred rather than the value of the
payment.
The FCC's emphasis on the act of
paying consideration, regardless of
the value, suggests that the key factor is merely the presence of an
81
exchange for any consideration.
The fact that a radio station is willing to exchange valuable airtime for

Communications Act Amendments
1960, the FCC stated that "the commission is of the view that the receipt
of any records by a station which are
intended by the supplier to be, or have
the practicaleffect of being an inducement to play those particular records
or any other records on the air, and
the broadcast of such records,
requires an appropriate announcement pursuant to Section 317."84

specifically addressed records. The
Amendments, however, have altered
the status of records as payment for
broadcast, permitting record labels
to supply records to build a radio sta87
tion's catalog of music.
In the same public notice, the FCC
applied the same standard to other
forms of consideration, items unaffected by the Amendments. In considering "record hops" or radio station promotions involving door prizes
and live entertainment supplied by
record labels, the FCC stated that
"although ostensibly it may appear
that money, services, or other valuable consideration is being provided
gratuitously for use in some aspect of
the presentation of the record hop
itself, where such considerationis, in
fact, provided for the purpose of or
has the practical effect of inducing
on-the-air mentions or record spins,
the accompanying

announcement

shall clearly state that such consideration is being provided, and by
whom, in exchange for the broadcast
*"88 The application of this standard to a different form of consideration suggests that it extends beyond
free records to all forms of consideration that may induce broadcast, even
though ostensibly offered for reasons
other than broadcast. Thus, the FCC
will consider the parties' intent and
the practical effect of their actions to
determine whether the choice of
broadcast material has been influ-

This standard covers the common
practice of supplying radio stations

enced, even in the absence of an
explicit agreement. 8 9

with free records without any agreement as to the broadcast of those
records. 8 5 Despite the absence of an
explicit agreement, the FCC asserts

Building on this inquiry, the FCC
has articulated an additional standard for agreements inducing broad-

that a payola disclosure is necessary
if the records were intended to
induce or have the practical effect of
inducing broadcast. 86 This standard
,5af

cast that on their face merely involve
the exchange of consideration for
other goods and services.

The FCC

addressed this situation in In re
Broadcast of "Living Should be

Fun". 90 In that case, a radio station
purchased a program from the creator, Food Plus. The creator then
purchased advertising on the station.
This advertising indirectly reimbursed the station's cost of purchasing the program. According to the
FCC, "The purchase of the program
and the sale of spot announcements
were parts of one transaction in
which Food Plus reimbursed the station for all or a substantial portion of
its costs for the program, and thus, at
least indirectly, paid for the program." Thus, the FCC ruled that
some offers to buy advertising can be
improperly coupled with inducements to purchase and air a program. Therefore, the FCC requires
that radio stations disclose promises
and agreements to purchase advertising time made as an inducement
to broadcast.
In In re Mattel, Inc., the FCC further clarified regulation of advertising promises for programming. 9 1 In
that case, Mattel offered to purchase
advertising on radio stations that
had previously purchased rights to
use one of its programs. The cost to
Mattel to buy the advertising was
equal to the amount the stations
spent to buy the rights to the show,
thereby reimbursing the stations.
Though the advertisements ran
before and after the program rather
than within it, the FCC found the
facts involved in the transaction indicated two simultaneous offers. The
FCC emphasized the timing of the
transaction, noting that "since
Mattel is making a simultaneous
offer to purchase advertising on
those stations which buy the program at a rate equal to that which
the station pay for the program ...
the purchase of the program and the
sale of spot announcements were

'9 2
parts of one transaction.
The Living Should be Fun and the
Mattel decisions demonstrate that
payments purportedly for advertis-

ing, marketing, or another service or
good but which actually induce a station to broadcast a program require
disclosure under the statute. 9 3 The
decisions emphasize that some
inducements, though seemingly separate transactions, can be recharacterized as a single transaction in
which a party agrees to purchase
advertising and the radio station
agrees to air a program. 9 4 Each situation, however, is fact-intensive. In
Mattel, the FCC emphasized that it
"has reviewed carefully the facts"
and "is unable to distinguish the
basic facts in this case from those
which characterized" other payola
Thus, not every
arrangements. 95
advertising arrangement functions
as an inducement to broadcast. The
analysis turns on timing, intent, and
the relationship of the parties in each
case. The FCC's application of the
standard set forth in Living Should
Be Fun and Mattel helps illustrate
the difference between innocent business

transactions

and

improper

inducements.
Explicit agreements and inducements are not the only forms of payola. Pursuant to both §317(c) of the
and
Act
Communications
§73.1212(b) of the FCC's rules, each
licensee is required to "exercise reasonable diligence to obtain from its
employees, and from other persons
with whom it deals" information to
enable the licensee to comply with
the disclosure requirements of the
Act. 9 6 For example, In re Carter
Publications, Inc. a disc jockey owned
songwriting royalties in a song he
97
was playing and promoting.
Though no consideration for the
60 -.
. .. . .

broadcast was actually paid, the conflict of interest created questions
about his motivation behind broadcasting certain material and doubts
about who was actually influencing
the listening public. The FCC scrutinizes such situations, generally
requiring additional safeguards
rather than immediately penalizing
a statutory violation. In that case,
the radio stations were required to
implement "new policies to insure
that all station's program material
continues to be selected on the basis
of its merit and that those associated
with program material are not in any
way influenced by their personal
98
interests in making the decisions."
No specific policies were promulgated, but the FCC stated that "it may
fall short of reasonable diligence if
the licensee ...does nothing more
than require its employees to execute
affidavits stating that they will not
violate laws and regulations proFurthermore,
hibiting payola." 99
"the reasonable diligence standard
can require a higher duty of care by
stations whose formats or other circumstances make them more suscepSuch stations
tible to payola." 10 0
would include those reporting to
record charting services. 10 1 Thus, in
determining whether improper influence has been exercised, the FCC
must examine both the institutional
station policies and the individual
motivations of its employees.
Analysis of possible payment for
broadcast situations must begin with
the facts.

The FCC determines

whether the facts of the situation
indicate that the actions affected the
To
choice of broadcast material.
make this determination, the FCC
looks for explicit agreements or
inducements that result in payment
for broadcast. In evaluating induce-

ment situations, the standard
requires the consideration to either
be intended to or have the practical
effect of inducing a broadcast. In
considering advertisements
and
marketing agreements ostensibly
unrelated to payment for broadcast,
the FCC focuses on the timing of
the transactions. If a payment for
broadcast is found, the analysis
shifts to the existence and adequacy
of on-air disclosures.

paid for or furnished by" the sponsor. 10 6 The FCC refined this requirement in later cases. The FCC reiterated that "mere mention of the name
of the sponsor" was inadequate,
requiring announcements to give
"some indication that the program is
10 7

in fact sponsored or paid for."
The
FCC further emphasized this position when it rejected announcements
using the words "presented by." The
FCC found that "the term 'presented

Furthermore, "the announcement
must be aired 'at the time of the
broadcast."'

Thus, an adequate disclosure announcement would air at
the time a song is played and say
"sponsored by," "paid for by," or "furnished by" the name of the party paying for the broadcast. Though this is
an apparently simple statement to
make at the time of broadcast, it is
nonetheless vital to ensuring a payola violation does not occur.

by' does not clearly inform the audi-

fcc regulation of
sponsorship identification
In its rules, the FCC sets forth
requirements regarding sponsorship
identification. The rules essentially
mirror the statute but contain more
specific

disclosure

requirements.

According to the FCC, payment for
broadcast disclosures must state that
the broadcast material is "sponsored,
paid for, or furnished, either in whole
or in part, and by whom or on whose
behalf such consideration was supplied." 10 2 The rules specifically state
that "the term 'sponsored' shall be
deemed to have the same meaning as
'paid for."' 10 3
This standard is rigorously
enforced. In early cases, the FCC
indicated that the exact wording of
the identification was to be left to the
discretion of the radio station,
though the announcement "should at
least state in language understandable to the majority of viewers that
suppliers of goods or services have
paid ... to display or promote the
products ... and each supplier should
be properly identified." 10 4 Identification merely consisting of "This has
been a [Sponsor's Name] production"
was insufficient. 10 5 The FCC wanted
the disclosures to "convey to the listener the fact that the program was

ence that it is hearing or viewing
matter which has been paid for,"
thereby failing to "state in language
understandable to a majority of the
audience that the station has
received consideration for the matter
broadcast and from whom consideration was received." 10 8 According to
the FCC, "Such an identification is
subject to differing interpretations
and could lead to public confusion
and misunderstanding." 10 9 Public
confusion about the true nature of
the broadcast defeats the statute's

industry practices
challenging the law
Despite the numerous interpretations and FCC guidelines concerning
permissible payments for broadcast,
record labels and radio stations push
the limits of the law by continuing
traditional industry practices and
devising new strategies that involve
undisclosed payments for broadcast.
Record labels and radio stations
claim that these practices are not

purpose and the FCC's goal of ensuring that the public is "informed of any

and do not require disclosures. Close
scrutiny of the facts surrounding certain industry practices, however,

otherwise undisclosed private financial interest affecting the selection and

reveals that these practices generally
involve payment for broadcast that

presentation of program matter."110
The FCC decisions do not give a

should be disclosed.

clear-cut answer to the question of

free albums

what is and always will be an adequate disclosure. In fact, the FCC
has said that "the public interest
would be better served by continu-

One traditional practice in the
music industry is for record labels to

ance of our policy of dealing with the
subject on a case-by-case basis."11 1
Nevertheless, an FCC attorney has
provided examples of a disclosure
sufficient to immunize deals involving possible payments for broadcast:
"The law requires identifying who
'sponsored, paid for, or furnished' the
song. That precise wording is 'exact112
ly what we want to hear."'
,61

supply radio stations with free
albums. 1 1 3 According to a report
from the United States House of
Representatives, supplying albums
should not be considered a per se violation of the statute. 114 "A record distributor furnishes copies of records to
a broadcast station or a disc jockey
for broadcast purposes.
No
announcement is required unless the
supplier furnished more copies of a
particular recording than are needed

for broadcast purposes." 1 15 Though
"broadcast purposes" is not defined,
non-broadcast uses may be identified
by the quantity of records provided.

began. 1 23 This is a factual argument
that must be decided upon the evidence. The FCC scrutinizes album
giveaways, contests, and promotion-

payment for broadcast arise at the
moment the band is hired to play at
the event. To ensure the success of
the free concert, some stations guar-

For example, "should the record supplier furnish 50 or 100 copies of the
same release ... an announcement
would be required because consideration beyond the matter used on the

al tie-ins to determine if they have
the practical effect of inducing radio
stations to play a record label's
music. 1 24 If the FCC finds such

antee increased airplay to a band in
exchange for a concert appearance. 1 30 The program director at
New York's Z-100, for example,

influence, a disclosure is required
regardless of whether a deal guarantees airplay or only involves songs

admitted that a tacit term of such
deals is that the stations will play

broadcast was received." 116 Albums
and other consideration provided for
the personal use and retention of
radio station personnel also require
disclosure. For example, if "a perfume manufacturer gives five dozen
bottles to the producer of a giveaway
show, some of which are to be identified and awarded to winners on the
show, the remainder to be retained
by the producer ... constitute[s] payment."1 17 Thus, depending on the
quantity and purpose of the albums
supplied, disclosure may be and usually is required. 118
In addition to broadcast purposes,
radio stations also receive free
albums and other goods for use in
contests and other promotions to
generate publicity and help attract
sponsors. 1 19 In some cases, the
impropriety of such "promotional"
payola is clear. For example, record
labels often underwrite radio station
contests, such as flying winners to
meet a top band, in exchange for the
station's airing of the label's new
acts. 120 In other situations, however,
the agreements are not as explicit
and only involve consideration that
is nominal in value, such as Tshirts. 12 1 Nevertheless, in both cases,
broadcasts made in exchange for such
consideration must be accompanied
12 2
by the proper disclosure.
Stations often defend themselves
by arguing that songs received airplay before the free items arrived and
before the promotions and tie-ins

already on the playlist. An Emmis
Communications station in Chicago,
for example, created a promotional
package alleged to include explicit

the single of the starring bands.
However, the station denied ever
offering to play a band's songs in
exchange for its appearance at the
station's concerts. 13 1

promises of airplay as part of the
Emmis' chairman claimed,
deal.
however, that the deal permitted
promotions only after a song had

When the station bears the cost of
the free concert, its own self-interest
dictates that it should play the
band's music. 13 2 Such stations hope

been added. 1 25 In either situation,
however, a disclosure would be
If there is an explicit
required.
broadcast a song or if
to
agreement
the stations are induced to play
songs, such deals violate the statute

to realize a financial benefit from
these events through increased rat1 33
ings and advertising revenue.
Promotion of the event through

absent disclosure. Thus, contests,
tie-ins, and other promotional deals
that have the practical effect of
inducing airplay or that are designed
to solicit payment for broadcast
require disclosure.

free concerts
Another promotional tool radio
stations utilize is the free concert.126
Free concerts are generally large
events promoted by a single radio
station that rents a venue and hires
a band. 12 7 The radio station or the
label may cover the costs associated
with the band's performance, or, as is
becoming the trend, the bands will
actually perform for free or reduced
rates. 12 8 No matter who pays, a
band's appearance at a station's free
concert is routinely accompanied by
an increase in the airplay of the
band's music. 12 9 Concerns regarding

music played on the station increases
the turn-out, adding financial incentives. 134 The station's financial interest, therefore, conflicts with the §317
requirement that stations insulate
the program selection process from
potential conflicts of interest. 13 5 As a
result, a disclosure must be made to
satisfy the statute.
Payola may also occur when the
record label pays the costs of a free
concert or the band performs for a
reduced rate. The bands and the
record labels are pressured by radio
stations to provide performances at
these events. 13 6 Often the stations
refuse to air a band's latest releases
unless it commits to a free concert
performance. 13 7 In some cases, the
stations have even threatened to ban
all of a record label's upcoming
releases if the label fails to persuade
the band to perform. 138 Thus, to get
a song played, the bands and the
record labels must sometimes grace

radio stations with a free concert
appearance. 13 9 Though the concert
appearances secure radio airplay, in

tions. 14 5 These vacation-like "business trips" often involve artist performances and showcases. 146 Record

many instances the song is only
played for several weeks prior to the

labels contend that these events are
not payola but are merely events featuring artists and their music in a
special environment favorable to the
songs. 1 47 They add that the trips are

concert and dropped immediately
after the event. 140 Based on past
FCC scrutiny of "record hops" which
also involved free performances, free
concerts alone appear to be
inducements to broadcast. 14 1 In fact, one FCC
official has said, "If a
broadcaster
is getting
something valuable, like
an artist performing at the

simply designed to make a memo-

tions. 150 The FCC finds itself "compelled to reject the contention ...that
no announcement is required because
such 'favors' are normal business
practices." 15 1 Furthermore, the FCC
has found "situations where consideration ...[for example, a trip to a
resort] is provided as an inducement to
the licensee or its employees or independent contractors to broadcast
certain matter" sufficient
152
to require disclosure.

The FCC scrutinizes album

In a case involving a
television broadcast, the

giveaways, contests, and

FCC

found that free
rooms and food, as well as
entire trips, qualified as
consideration offered to

station's
concert,
in
exchange for playing the
artist's song and they don't
identify the sponsor of the
record, then they are in
1 42
violation of the law."

promotional tie-ins to

This requirement does not
mean that artists' free con-

radio stations to play a recoird

cert appearances must
cease. A performer may,
without any disclosure,
perform at a concert or

label's music. If the FCC

show for free because "the
performer likes the show,
although the performer normally commands a much higher
announcement fee." 14 3 If the FCC
determines that a performance has
the effect of inducing airplay or
favorable mentions, however, disclosure must be made. 144

free trips
Though record labels and bands
receive pressure from radio stations
to supply free albums, support contests, and appear at free concerts,
record labels engage in similar tactics to secure airplay. It is common
practice for record labels to fly program directors and other radio station personnel to resort destina-

determine if they have the

influence

programming

choices. 15 3

In CBS, Inc.,
network employees were
provided
"substantial

practical effect of inducing

finds such influence, a
disclosure is required ....
rable impact on the radio personnel. 148 In fact, radio stations claim that
these and other payola activities are
exempt as "normal business practices."
The essential purpose of these
vacation trips, however, is to convince executives to play the label's
records. Under FCC standards, the
mere fact that such trips were
offered to stations by labels suggests
that they were intended to induce or
had the practical effect of inducing a
broadcast, thereby requiring disclosure. 14 9 In addition, the FCC explicitly rejects the idea of any "normal
business practice" exemption characterizing such trips as payola violaUfi&-

consideration" in the
form of free rooms, food,
and beverages by a
hotel. 15 4 In exchange for
these free items, the television producer permitted
scoreboard identifications
of the hotel to be placed
------- in
a manner which

insured frequent on-camera exposure. Such a tactic not only violated
the broadcaster's policy limiting
identification of host hotels, but,
according to the FCC, required a disclosure under the statute. The decision suggests that all payments for
broadcast must be disclosed, whether
they result in a simple increase of oncamera exposure of a provider's
name or in a substantial influence on
15 5
a station's programming.
the mega-deal
In addition to standard industry
practices involving free albums, concerts, and trips, the record labels and

radio stations have developed a new
industry tie-in, the "mega marketing
deal."' 15 6 These deals have record
labels paying large sums of money to
the radio stations in exchange for
advertising time. 1 57 Though advertising is not in itself a violation of the
payment for broadcast laws, this new
breed of marketing deals creates the
same hazard facing many of the standard industry practices: inducement.
In Re Mattel, Inc. and In Re
Broadcast of "Living Should Be Fun"
both involved marketing agreements
that exchanged advertising purchases for airplay. 1 58 In those situations,
the FCC explained how the purchase
of advertising and the purchase of
the program were two sides of one
transaction. 159 Whether the transactions are simultaneous and whether
the actions affect broadcasting choices are issues the FCC resolves on a
case-by-case basis. 1 60 In addition to
examining the transaction, the FCC
also focuses on whether the consideration in the marketing deals is
intended to, or has the effect of
inducing, airplay of the advertising
party's songs. 16 1 As with exchanges
involving free records, free concerts,
and free trips, the intent and the
practical effect of marketing agreements is suspiciously favorable to
62

1
both sides.
For example, in an agreement
and
Records
A&M
between
Chancellor Media Corporation, the
owner of more than 400 radio stapaid
A&M
nationwide,
tions

$237,000 for a marketing campaign
to support a song through a series of
16 3
The
commercials and contests.
airif
that
FCC has consistently held
play occurs as a result of a promotional agreement, the issue of
16 4
inducement is at least raised.
Though the record label is ostensibly

only paying for marketing, the radio
stations may be playing the song
because they received the high revenues and hope for more. As in
Living Should Be Fun and Mattel
this arrangement could lead to a
FCC finding that the deals involved a
simultaneous exchange of marketing
dollars for an airplay guarantee.
Furthermore, a deal worth $237,000
involving the marketing of a song is
intended to or at least has the practical effect of inducing airplay. This
induced play is illegal payola and
165

requires disclosure.
Certain facts may, however, disprove the existence of illegal payola
in such a case. For example, a high
level of airplay prior to the marketing agreement suggests that the song
was aired as a broadcasting decision
and not in exchange for payment. In
the timing of the A&M/Chancellor
deal, the facts suggested that the
song was played as a result of the
marketing deal. The song, Bryan
Adams' "On A Day Like Today,"
quickly hit the charts and as quickly
fell off the charts. 16 6 Despite the
decline in ratings, the song continued
to receive airplay at four stations all
167
Though
owned by Chancellor.
Chancellor executives contended
that the record company paid for

marketing, not airtime, industry
commentators have suggested that
the song continued to receive airplay
because of the marketing agreePaying such a large
ment. 16 8
amount for a song suggests intent.
This factor is not conclusive, however. After all, had more stations
played the song and had it been a hit,
no one would have questioned the
station's motives. Even absent illegal
intent, the large marketing dollars
paid to promote this song had the
practical effect of inducing airplay.
64

The economic incentive of marketing
revenue, coupled with the fact that
the only stations playing the song
were the ones most benefited, suggests inducement.
In addition to the lucrative marketing agreement, there were other
inducements for play in this case. As
part of the marketing deal, winners
from other Chancellor stations were
flown to attend a Bryan Adams concert in which he waived his performance fee. 16 9 As noted earlier, any
airplay received as a result of this
free concert must be disclosed. The
critical factor, once again, is whether
the airplay was exchanged for the
consideration, be it a free concert or
Under the
advertising revenue.
standards set forth in FCC decisions
and notices, this free concert/contest
may or may not be intended to
induce airplay, but it very likely has
the practical effect of inducing such
play. 170 Accordingly, the trip, the
concert, and the entire marketing
deal should have been disclosed
when the song was played.
the name game
addition to the marketing
agreements exemplified by the
A&M/Chancellor deal, there is
In

another type of marketing technique
gaining popularity. This technique,
often referred to as "pay-to-name,"
occurs when a record label pays a
radio station to air an advertisement
immediately before or after one of its
songs is aired. 1 7 1 "Pay to name"
generally backadvertisements
announce information about the song
17 2
such as the title and the artist.
The advertisements are also intended to add information such as the
name of the song's album and also
where the album can be purchased. 17 3 Some music industry

Nashville song now, radio stations
may receive advertising revenues if
the song becomes a hit and could be
induced to play the songs. Although

commentators believe that it should
be standard practice for radio stations to announce such informa1 74

To ensure the listeners have
enough information to purchase the
music they want, the argument goes,
tion.

the intent may not be to secure airplay, the potential advertising revenues could have the practical effect

pay-to-name advertisements are hardly improper and may even be necessary. 175 Supporters of these advertisements maintain that such payments
do not influence airplay but rather
only influence the buying public.
The details surrounding the typical pay-to-name agreement indicate
that record labels indeed may be only

fact, they have recently requested the
FCC to open a review of broadcasting
deals.1 8 2 The FCC has refused.
Despite FCC reluctance, some legisla-

the need for change

tors' growing impatience with the lack

Though the legal analysis suggests that complete marketing disclosure should be required, the history

of competition in broadcasting, its
effect on consumers, and the appearance of impropriety of the new payment for broadcast schemes suggests
that the landscape in the music indus-

generally been lax in enforcing the
payment for broadcast laws. 1 79 The
situation involving Bryan Adams, for

before or after selected
records announcing the
artists, the song, the
album, and retail loca17 6
tions for purchase.

ii legal payola not only results

The ads were designed

iin

try is not through changing. In fact,
further alteration of the current landscape is the only way to end the questionable uses and abuses of payola.
Though businesses in other
industries commonly entertain clients and partners to
generate business, such
practices

for songs that were
already playing and had
been proven successful
on the charts. 1 77 An
announcement stating
that the ads were paid

pay-for-play and criticized the concentration of power resulting from
radio station conglomerates. 18 1 In

of inducing play.

of FCC regulation indicates that this
move will not occur. The FCC has

paying to inform the public of the
artist's name and album. Recently,
Capitol Nashville paid CBS-owned
radio stations to air 10-second ads

(D-Minn.) and Rep. John Conyers (DMich.) have voiced concern about

poor music and exploitatioi1

n the music industry,
L)ut it also misleads a
t

rusting audience.

for accompanied the 10-second spots, disclosing the
payment for broadcast regarding the
paid advertisements but not regarding the song itself. 178 The presence of
the disclosure and the songs' popu-

example, has been investigated without reprimand. 180 In addition, the
FCC lacks the resources to investigate every potential instance of pay-

larity prior to the paid advertising
indicate that such tactics were pure
marketing and not payments to

ola. After all, mass illegal promotional practices involve far less
money than the mega-promotion

broadcast songs. However, the risk
of inducement still exists even if the
record labels do not explicitly dictate

deals. The reality of lax enforcement

which songs will be played but
instead tie advertising dollars to airplay. This connection can create an
incentive for a station to play the
labels' music. By adding a Capitol

in

the

music

industry are prohibited in
order that "the public . . .
know by whom it is persuaded." 18 3 Nevertheless,
record labels and broadcasting companies routinely

engage in practices that test
the limits of the law. An
application of the payment
for broadcast regulations to current
industry trends has demonstrated
that most promotional practices in
the industry violate the purpose if
not the language of the law. Despite

suggests that mandatory disclosure
of all payments for broadcast is
implausible. Some in Congress, how-

the current debate, the industry is
already mired in illegal payola and
would be better served by engaging
in explicit payment for broadcasts if
properly disclosed under the law.
Currently, illegal payola allows

ever, are unwilling to accept this. In
reaction to reports of new tactics for

powerful radio conglomerates to
demand money and other considera-

circumventing the payment for
broadcast laws, Sen. Paul Wellstone

tion in return for airplay. Though
large record labels could benefit from
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this, small labels are unable to compete and artists are exploited by station demands such as free concerts.

motional deals between stations and
labels to be disclosed, the rule creates incentives to move away from

When airplay is determined solely by
money and power, small labels and
artists are exploited and the music
suffers. Without incentives to foster

free concerts and the like to outright
pay-for-play. By engaging in explicit

artistic freedom or nurture

new

styles, the music becomes less of an
innovative entertaining art form and
more of a manufactured product sent

payment for broadcast, the stations
could continue to receive the equivalent of advertising revenue while the
labels could maximize airplay, their
most effective marketing
nism.

mecha-

to radio with guaranteed airplay.
Despite these negative effects, illegal payola's most harmful effect falls
Not
on listeners and consumers.

Critics will likely claim that such
a rule harks back to the days of payola and will promote substandard
music and illicit activities related to

only are they deprived of music aired
on such merits as artistic value, but
They believe
they are deceived.

payola. The primary effect of the
rule, however, would be to end all
undisclosed payments for broadcast.
In addition, the economic incentives

songs aired on the radio are chosen
by experts with an interest in identifying and playing the best music. In
reality, however, money determines
what songs are on the air, defrauding
listeners and consumers and undermining the policy of informing the
public by whom it is persuaded.
Thus, illegal payola not only results
in poor music and exploitation in the
music industry, but it also misleads a
trusting audience.
To end these and other effects of
undisclosed payments on the music
industry and the uninformed public,
disclosure of all record label/radio
station promotions and marketing
deals - from free T-shirt giveaways
and free concerts to advertising purchases and luxury artist showcases
- should be disclosed in accord with
FCC sponsorship identification stan-

involved under such a rule not only
prevent airing of substandard music
but foster music as an art form.
Furthermore, pay-for-play empowers
all record labels, especially independents, by bringing a better return on
dollars spent for promotion. As a
result, labels are empowered to test
the limits of the current music market and create new markets, fostering artistic freedom and innovative
music which ultimately benefits
music audiences.

quences
should,
however,
be
addressed as they arise. If pay-forplay greed spirals out of control, new
regulations setting a statutory price
limit on airtime can be implemented.
For now, radio station consolidation has changed the music landscape and the industry faces a crisis.
Though the debate over pay-for-play
will continue to rage in the music
industry, it is clear that radio station
consolidation resulting from the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 has
greatly altered the music industry.
Consolidation has shifted the focus
from the music to revenues. This
emphasis compels radio to eschew
artistic innovation in favor of status
quo "cookie cutter" acts that have
proven to secure listeners. Though
this helps maintain advertising revenues, it does little to grow the market, leaving revenue-hungry stations
dependent on record labels for additional revenues. By taking artistic
risks, stations could be instrumental
in breaking the next big act and
thereby increase their bottom line
through more productive and fanfriendly means.
The economics of the current environment, however, do not permit it.

Despite the advantage of moving
to industrywide pay-for-play, there
may be unforeseen consequences.

The power held by the station conglomerates enables them to essen-

Record labels, economically influenced by spiraling pay-for-play costs,
may expand into radio station owner-

enues from record labels. In this
environment, the only way to balance
power among the parties is pay-forplay, in which airtime has a price
that all are equally free to pay.

dards. Such a rule would require
industry practices that explicitly and
implicitly influence broadcast matter
to be disclosed, satisfying the FCC

ship; radio stations, empowered by
the revenues from pay-for-play, may
end normal advertising and air payfor-play music twenty-four hours a
day; or pay-for-play, predominantly
utilized by record labels, may expand

goal of informing the public by whom
it is persuaded. Furthermore, the
mass disclosure would improve the
music industry. By requiring all pro-

to include managers, promoters, publishers, songwriters, and any other
parties having an interest in a song's
airplay. 18 4 These and other conse66f

tially demand perks and easy rev-

Whether or not the environment is
altered or disclosed pay-for-play
becomes the standard, in the end, the
success of the music industry
depends on providing listeners a
choice and letting them choose which
new acts they want to take to superstardom.
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